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The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege:
Loss of Predictability Does Not Justify Crying
Wolfinbarger
By Paul R. Rice*

INTRODUCTION
Recently, Jack Friedman examined the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit's landmark decision of Garner v. Wofinbargerl and the subse2
quent expansion of the Garner exception to the attorney-client privilege.
This exception recognized a shareholder's right to examine privileged
communications between corporate officers or directors and corporate
legal counsel in the context of shareholder derivative actions.
This right was premised on the fiduciary duty that corporate management owes to shareholders. 3 The court held that when shareholders are
pursuing the interests of the corporation in a derivative action, they are
entitled to access to privileged communications if these communications
are important to establishing the validity of their claims. 4 To obtain this
*Mr. Rice is a Professor of Law at the American University Washington College of Law
where he has taught evidence for a quarter of a century. He is the author of two leading
treatises on the attorney-client privilege. See PAUL R. RICE, ATITORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter RICE, ATTFORNEY-CLIENT PRMLEGE];
PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: STATE LAW (2000).

1. 430 F2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970).
2. SeeJack R Friedman, Is the Garner Qualficationof the CorporateAttorney-ClientPrivilege Viable
AfierJaffee v. Redmond?, 55 Bus. LAw. 243 (1999).
3. Describing this fiduciary duty the Garnercourt explained that
in assessing management assertions of injury to the corporation it must be borne in
mind that management does not manage for itself and that the beneficiaries of its action
are the stockholders. Conceptualistic phrases describing the corporation as an entity
separate from its stockholders are not useful tools of analysis. They serve only to obscure
the fact that management has duties which run to the benefit ultimately of the stockholders.
Garner,430 E2d at 1101.
4. In so holding, the court
reject[ed] the idea that the prospective decision of the client on whether to abide by
advice or disregard it, or the guarantee of a veil of secrecy, either establishes or narrows
the attorney's obligation in the giving of advice. And to grant to corporate management
735
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right the shareholders must demonstrate "good cause." 5 Mr. Friedman
correctly characterized this "good cause" determination as nothing more
than a balancing test-balancing the bona fides of the shareholders' claims
and their need for the information against the corporate managers' need
6
for confidentiality in their own legal consultations.

This "fiduciary duty exception '

7

to the attorney-client privilege has

gained wide acceptance in both federal and state courts. 8 The exception
also has been radically expanded. 9 From shareholder derivative actions
(which are brought by one or more shareholders for the benefit of the
corporate entity and of all shareholders) it has been expanded to nonderivative actions (in which the shareholder's action is primarily for her

own individual financial benefit).' 0
Outside the corporate context, the exception has been recognized in
many instances where a fiduciary duty has been owed to non-shareholders.
Examples include a suit by the Secretary of Labor against former
officials of a pension fund for their violation of their fiduciary duties
[to contributors to the fund;' 1] a suit between a limited partner and
plenary assurance of secrecy for opinions received is to encourage it to disregard with
impunity the advice sought.
Id. at 1102 (footnote omitted).
5. The court listed a number of factors that should be considered in deciding whether
"good cause" has been shown:
the number of shareholders and the percentage of stock they represent; the bona fides
of the shareholders; the nature of the shareholders' claim and whether it is obviously
colorable; the apparent necessity or desirability of the shareholders having the information and the availability of it from other sources; whether, if the shareholders' claim
is of wrongful action by the corporation, it is of action criminal, or illegal but not
criminal, or of doubtful legality; whether the communication related to past or to prospective actions; whether the communication is of advice concerning the litigation itself;
the extent to which the communication is identified versus the extent to which the
shareholders are blindly fishing; the risk of revelation of trade secrets or other information in whose confidentiality the corporation has an interest for independent reasons.
Id. at 1104.
6. "The Garnerrule is a balancing test that determines whether the shareholders' need to
discover the communications outweighs the importance of protecting its confidentiality."
Friedman, supra note 2, at 243 (footnote omitted).
7. See 1 RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, supra note *, §§ 8:17-8:25, at 107-38 (discussing the "fiduciary duty exception" to the attorney-client privilege).
8. See id.
9. See id. § 8:23, at 130.
10. See, e.g., Fausek v. White, 965 E2d 126, 130-31 (6th Cir. 1992); Ward v. Succession of
Freeman, 854 F2d 780, 786 (5th Cir. 1988); Gerrits v. Brannen Banks of Florida, Inc., 138
ER.D. 574, 578-79 (D. Colo. 1991); Burghart v. Landau, No. 82 Civ. 2181, 1985 WL 209, at
*5-*6 (S.D.N.Y Jan. 23, 1985); Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 80 ER.D. 480, 484 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(citation omitted); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 55 ER.D. 211, 213 (N.D. Ill. 1972). But see Weil
v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Management, Inc., 647 E2d 18, 23 (9th Cir. 1981).
11. See Donovan v. Fitzsimmons, 90 ER.D. 583, 586 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
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a general partner in the same general partnership; [12] actions by union members against union officers;[ 13] an action by trust beneficiaries against the trust and its trustee; [14] an action by an excess insurer
against the primary insurer; [15] an action by creditors against a bankruptcy creditor's committee;[16] actions by minority shareholders
against majority shareholders; [17] an action by a corporation against
a former executive who, while employed by the plaintiff, formed a
competing corporation; [18] and an action on behalf of a corporation

against the law firm that represented the corporation. [19]20
As a few courts have done, 21 Mr. Friedman does not simply want to
limit Garner to the facts of that case-namely shareholder derivative actions. He proposes that Garnerbe abolished and corporate shareholders in
derivative actions be given an absolute right to access the privileged communications of corporate management. He would equate shareholders

bringing derivative actions with the management of the corporation pro22
tecting and preserving the interests of the corporate entity
The linchpin of Mr. Friedman's proposal is that predictability in the
application of the privilege protection is critical to its effectiveness and
success: Openness and candor by the client can only be encouraged if the
client knows that his communications with legal counsel are, and will remain, confidential and protected. 23 Thus, Mr. Friedman concludes that
because uncertainty is created by the "fiduciary duty" exception and because its application depends on subsequent developments that are unpredictable, the exception itself should be eliminated.

12. See Fortson v. Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & Minick, 961 E2d 469, 475-76 n.5 (4th
Cir. 1992).
13. See Mallick v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 749 E2d 771, 783-85 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
14. See Wildbur v. ARCO Chem. Co., 974 E2d 631, 645 (5th Cir. 1992).
15. See Central Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Medical Protective Co., 107 ER.D. 393, 394-95 (E.D.
Mo. 1985) (mem.).
16. See In re Baldwin-United Corp., 38 B.R. 802, 805 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984).
17. See In re Transocean Tender Offer Sec. Litig., 78 ER.D. 692, 694-97 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
18. SeeJ.H. Chapman Group, Ltd. v. Chapman, No. 95 C 7716, 1996 WL 238863, at
*1-*2 (N.D. Ill. May 2, 1996).
19. See In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 130 ER.D. 560, 597 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (mem.).
20. 1 RICE, ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, supra note *, § 8:23, at 130-32.
21. See, e.g., Well v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Management, Inc., 647 E2d 18,
23 (9th Cir. 1981).
22. "[P]laintiff shareholders who are litigating a derivative suit on its merits should have
an unconditional right to discover corporate attorney-client communications, because such
shareholders are acting in the role of management during the course of the derivative litigation on its merits." Friedman, supra note 2, at 281.
23. This observation reflects the U.S. Supreme Court's statement that "[a]n uncertain
privilege ... is little better than no privilege at all." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383, 393 (1981).
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In support of his thesis, Friedman discusses two cases in which the U.S.
24
Supreme Court has voiced the need for predictability-Jaffee v. Redmond
and In re Sealed Case.25 In each of these cases the balancing away of an
individual's privilege protection was rejected because it would make the
privilege unpredictable, and therefore, ineffective. In Jaffee, the Court recognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege and insisted that it cannot be
subject to an after-the-fact balancing test because that would destroy the
effectiveness of the privilege. "Making the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge's later evaluation of the relative importance of
the patient's interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure
26
would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege."
In In re Sealed Case the decision of the D.C. Circuit that was discussed
by Mr. Friedman was reversed by the Supreme Court in Swidler & Berlin
v. United States.27 The reversal, however, also supports Mr. Friedman's thesis
that predictability is fundamental to privileges designed to encourage open
and candid communications. Swidler & Berlin involved the survival of an
individual's attorney-client privilege after the client's death. In Swidler, a
lawyer, who had been consulted by White House Counsel Vincent Foster,
had been subpoenaed by the Kenneth Starr grand jury investigating President Clinton and directed to produce the notes of his interview with Mr.
Foster, who had committed suicide. The Court held that if the privilege
were posthumously balanced away based on a subsequently developing
need, it could adversely affect the client's willingness to be candid with his
attorney about his testamentary interests and desires. "Posthumous disclosure of such communications may be as feared as disclosure during the
28
client's lifetime."
Crucial to these and the other decisions cited by Mr. Friedman was the
fact that the privileges were being discussed in the context of an individual
being encouraged to communicate with another by being given the protection of a privilege. The logic of those decisions has too little relevance
in the context of an entity client, like a corporation, to justify the action
Mr. Friedman proposes.
Unlike the individual client, who is encouraged to be more open and
candid by his knowledge that the privilege will prevent him from being
injured by his own words, predictability is not the driving force behind the
corporate attorney-client privilege because of (i) the manner in which the
privilege is applied-to a fictitious legal entity that cannot speak-and
(ii) the legal environment that requires corporate managers to seek legal

24. 518 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1996).
25. 124 E3d 230, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1997), rev'd sub nom. Swidler & Berlin v. United States,
524 U.S. 399, 411 (1998).
26. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 17.
27. 524 U.S. at 399.
28. Swidler &Berlin, 524 U.S. at 407.
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assistance, regardless of its confidential nature, in order to avoid personal
liability for their negligent mismanagement of corporate assets.

THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE
CORPORATE CONTEXT

THE LOGIC OF THE PRIVILEGE PROTECTION
The logic of the attorney-client privilege is that a client knowing that
he cannot be injured by his own words will reveal incriminating facts that
he otherwise might have suppressed. With this enhanced disclosure, the
lawyer will have more facts at his disposal that may be important to the
legal assistance he has been asked to render. This, in turn, will result in
more informed legal advice, which, it is believed, translates into greater
compliance with the requirements of the law 29 This same type of logic
justifies the psychotherapist-patient privilege addressed in Jaffee. The client
or patient must be encouraged to talk to facilitate the professional services
that further a societal goal.

THE SAME LOGIC IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THE
CORPORATE CONTEXT
There is a problem with this logic in the corporate context, however,
because the attorney-client privilege protects only the corporate entity,30 not
the individual officers, directors, and employees, who speak for the entity
on matters within the scope of their corporate responsibilities. 3 ' The privilege provides no directprotection to employees who create a risk of self-incrimination by speaking candidly with corporate counsel. 32 This was a reality

29. See 1 RICE, ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, supra note *, § 2:3, at 14-15.
30. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1981) (citation omitted).
31. All courts that have considered the suggestion that individual corporate agents be
permitted to assert the attorney-client privilege in their own behalf despite a waiver by the
corporation have rejected it. See United States v. Walls, No. 90-50412, 1991 WL 261632, at
**2-**3 (9th Cir. Dec. 10, 1991); In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corp.,
805 E2d 120, 125 (3rd Cir. 1986); Citibank, N.A. v. Andros, 666 E2d 1192, 1195 (8th Cir.
1981) (citations omitted); United States v. Piccini, 412 E2d 591, 593 (2d Cir. 1969); In re
Braniff, Inc., 153 B.R. 941, 944-45 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993); In re Cumberland Inv. Corp.,
120 B.R. 627, 629 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990) (citations omitted); In re Blier Cedar Co., 10 B.R.
993, 1000 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981); In re GrandJury Proceedings, 434 F Supp. 648, 650 (E.D.
Mich. 1977), affid, 570 E2d 562 (6th Cir. 1978); In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum,
391 E Supp. 1029, 1034 (S.D.N.Y 1975).
32. "The corporation's attorney-client privilege protection for the communications between its agents and attorney does not personally protect the agents, even though they may
have incurred personal liability from the actions on behalf of the corporation, and their
communications with counsel served only to incriminate themselves." 1 RiCE, ATTORNEYCLIENT PRIVILEGE, supra note *, § 4:21, at 97 (citing United States v. Aramony, 88 E3d 1369,
1388-92 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1239 (1997)). Similarly, officers and directors
may not prevent a corporation from waiving its privilege by exercising it individually. See
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that the U.S. Supreme Court never addressed in the Upjohn decision, in
which it attempted to define whose communications with corporate counsel are protected by the corporation's privilege, 33 or previously when the
Court extended the privilege protection to corporations. 34 Therefore, a
privilege designed to encourage more open communications when legal
assistance is sought by a business entity serves little, if any, purpose.
Every corporate employee who speaks with corporate counsel about

matters that could give rise to personal liability, jeopardizes his personal
wealth and freedom when he communicates with corporate counsel and
acknowledges actionable conduct. Unlike the attorney-client privilege that
was created for individuals, when extended to corporate entities, the individuals who are supposed to be encouraged to speak by the existence of
the privilege have no control over it. Consequently, whether the privilege
will later be asserted (for example, when communications are sought by a
grand jury or in a shareholders' derivative action), which would indirectly
protect, and thereby benefit, the individual employees, or will be waived
for the greater good of the corporation and its shareholders (which could
occur when a government agency like the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) demands disclosures before stock options are approved), is within the exclusive control of the corporate management' 35
generally referred to as the "control group."

UNPREDICTABILITY IS INHERENT WITH THE

CORPORATE PRIVILEGE
While corporate management might be disposed to use the entity's
privilege to protect its employees, this protection is indirect and quite fortuitous. Corporate management is precluded from doing this when waiver
would be in the best interests of the corporation. This was true, for example, in Upjohn and DiversifiedIndustries, Inc. v. Meredith,36 where privileged
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 349 (1985); In re Lancaster
Factoring Co., Ltd. v. Mangone, No. M12-329, 1996 WL 706925, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9,
1996); Polycast Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 125 ER.D. 47, 49 (S.D.N.Y 1989); GrandJury
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 391 F Supp. at 1034.
33. While denying that it had adopted a specific test for who personifies the corporate
client, the Court employed all of the factors important to the "subject matter" test. Under
this test, when any employee communicates with corporate counsel on matters within the
scope of his corporate responsibilities and the communications are in confidence and for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice or assistance, they will be protected by the corporation's
privilege. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394-95.
34. See United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318, 336-38 (1915).
35. See 1 RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, supra note *,§ 4:20, at 93.
36. 572 F2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977). Limited waiver was approved in Diversied Industries,
which permitted the corporation to make disclosures to a government agency, thereby waiving the privilege protection, but the waiver was limited to that disclosure. See id. at 611. This
result gave additional indirect protection to individuals whose communications were disclosed, most courts have rejected the limited waiver concept because it is inconsistent with
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communications were revealed to the SEC in order to resolve bribery
claims and gain agency approval of a stock option. Under management's
fiduciary duty to the shareholders, they are obligated to put the interests
of the entity first. If they fail to do so, they can expose themselves to
personal liability.
Therefore, when employees communicate with corporate counsel, they
can never know what circumstances will subsequently develop that will
make it beneficial for the corporation to waive its privilege protection (and
through that waiver, destroy any protection from which the employee
might benefit). That is, unpredictability is already inherent in the fabric
of the corporate privilege, regardless of whether the fiduciary duty exception is restricted to shareholder derivative claims, and thus does not create
a sufficient basis for eliminating the exception.

LACK OF PREDICTABILITY IS OF LITTLE CONSEQUENCE
Advocates of greater predictability for the corporate privilege may argue that as the level of unpredictability increases (for example, by the
extension of the Garner exception to nonderivative shareholder actions),
corporate officers and directors will stop seeking legal assistance. This
argument, of course, has been proven wrong in the current judicial environment in which Garnerhas been vastly expanded. Despite this increased
unpredictability, the sky has not fallen: Legal advice must always be sought
by corporate management in order to avoid personal liability for the consequences that might flow from that failure. Corporate officers are not
going to disregard the corporation's welfare and their personal financial
security simply because the privilege (which gives them no direct protection) can no longer be maintained.
Why then has the corporate privilege been successful? Why do corporate employees who implicate themselves in financial misdealings continue
to speak openly with corporate counsel? The question, of course, is loaded.
It assumes an unproven fact-that corporate employees are candid about
their own misdeeds. In a study of Fortune One-Hundred Corporations by
the Evidence Project at the American University Washington College of
Law, it was discovered that when employees know that they may be subject
to personal liability for their misdeeds, almost 30% of them are not candid
with corporate counsel.3 7 The 70% that continues to be candid expressed
the mistaken belief that the corporation would protect them.
the concept of confidentiality. See 2 RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, supra note *,
§§ 9:87-9:88, at 390-405.
37. See Professor Paul R. Rice, Director, Evidence Project American University Washington School of Law, Attorney-Client Privilege: Perceptions and Implications in the Corporate
Setting (April 1998) (unpublished survey) (on file with The Business Lawyer, University of
Maryland School of Law). In the study, hundreds of questionnaires were sent to agents of
each participating corporation-both executive and non-executive level employees. Because
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To whatever degree the corporate attorney-client privilege has been
successful in encouraging candid communications from corporate employees, the most significant reasons appears to be the mistaken beliefs
about the privilege.3 8 Even when they know they are not represented,
many employees speak with corporate legal counsel because of the economic power that the corporation holds over them-they either candidly
speak with counsel or are fired, the "talk or walk" ultimatum.

CONCLUSION
The attorney-client privilege is an exception to the principle that the
law is entitled to every man's evidence. It is an exception that courts profess
to strictly limit in its application to communications that are necessary to
achieve its goal of candor. When courts begin to appreciate that economic
pressure is the dynamic that compels what the privilege is mistakenly believed to accomplish in the corporate context, they may begin to realize
that the corporate privilege has survived by smoke and mirrors. As a consequence, the corporate privilege itself, rather than the "fiduciary duty"
exception that Mr. Friedman is concerned about, may be the victim of
the reevaluation he proposes.

these questionnaires were sent by in-house counsel, there was a high response rate. Question
eight of the survey asked:
If I knew that I was not personally protected when I communicate with corporate
counsel about corporate matters that could expose me to civil or criminal liability, I
would:
a. Speak less candidly with corporate counsel;
b. Not speak with corporate counsel until I had spoken with an attorney who personally represents me;
c. Speak candidly with corporate counsel, because I want the corporation to obtain
the most informed legal services;
d. Speak candidly with corporate counsel on the assumption that my interests and
the corporation's interests would be sufficiently identical so that the corporation
would protect me from exposure to liability by maintaining the confidentiality the
communication.
"5 0% would continue to speak openly on the belief that the corporation would protect
them because their interests are sufficiently identical." Id. at 5. "50% would not speak with
corporate counsel until they had spoken with an attorney who personally represented them."
Id. "28% would speak less candidly with corporate counsel." Id. The less candid 28% represented half of those who indicated that they would not speak with corporate counsel until
consulting their own counsel.
38. Fifty-five percent of all corporate executives erroneously believed that corporate counsel personally represented them when consulting on corporate matters that could lead to
personal liability. See id. at 4.

